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Abstract 
 
In this paper we address the question of minimal cognition by investigating the origin of some 
crucial cognitive properties from the very basic organisation of biological systems. More 
specifically, we propose a theoretical model of how a system can distinguish between specific 
features of its interaction with the environment, which is a fundamental requirement for the 
emergence of minimal forms of cognition. We argue that the appearance of this capacity is 
grounded in the molecular domain, and originates from basic mechanisms of biological regulation. 
In doing so, our aim is to provide a theoretical account that can also work as a possible conceptual 
bridge between Synthetic Biology and Artificial Intelligence. In fact, we argue, Synthetic Biology 
can contribute to the study of minimal cognition (and therefore to a minimal AI), by providing a 
privileged approach to the study of these mechanisms by means of artificial systems.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the deep connection between biological organisation and cognition at its very 
roots in basic living systems. The argument that we propose in the following pages pursues two 
main objectives. In the first place, starting from the framework of biological autonomy, we aim at 
developing a theoretical account of the origin of some minimal cognitive properties, by analysing 
the organisational requirements for their realisation: basically, the instantiation of regulatory 
mechanisms.  
One of the essential aspects of cognition, which can be analysed at the basic level, is that cognitive 
agents should be able to distinguish between some specific features of their interaction with the 
environment and to act accordingly, in such a way as to maintain their viability1. As we shall argue 
here by developing some of the insights coming from the tradition of research based on the notion 
of biological autonomy, this implies that they should be able to associate environmental 
perturbations with internal patterns of self-regulation (Bich and Damiano, 2012a)2. All present day 
living beings have this capacity, let us just think of how bacteria respond adaptively to the 
composition (and variation in composition) of the environment by means of internal changes, such 
as the synthesis of different sets of enzymes necessary for metabolising different substances, or by 
modulating their movement in the environment according to gradients of concentrations, like in the 
case of chemotaxis (Bich et al., 2015). And it is plausible that more primitive prebiotic self-
maintaining systems had also been capable of maintaining their organisation against environmental 
perturbations; even though this capacity might have been based on simpler mechanisms3.  
In the second place, by developing a theoretical account of minimal cognitive properties we aim at 
providing a bridge between the concepts and languages of Synthetic Biology (SB) and Artificial 
Intelligence (AI). While AI usually aims at studying and modelling high-level cognitive properties 
(e.g. at the human level), surprisingly interesting properties for understanding the origin of 
cognition can be found also in simpler biological systems such as bacteria and invertebrates, and 
they can provide insights into the functioning of more complex forms of cognition (Bechtel, 2014). 
Hence, an AI focused on the investigation of cognition at the minimal level requires an approach 
that is directly linked to biological processes, and this is what SB can provide4. The connection 
between the two disciplines has not been explored exhaustively yet, and the two disciplines still use 
distinct languages: cognitive for AI and biochemical for SB. Historically, in fact, SB has played an 
important role in Artificial Life, but not as much with respect to AI, apart from some pioneering 
                                                 
1
 By relying on this property, some theoretical approaches to the study of life and cognition have developed the L=C 
thesis according to which cognition is coextensive with life or coincides with the interactive dimension of life (Piaget, 
1967; Maturana and Varela, 1973, 1980; Heschl, 1990, Varela et al., 1991: Bitbol and Luisi, 2004, Bourgine and 
Stewart, 2004). According to other authors, instead, even though those exhibited by minimal living systems are 
important aspects of cognition, they are not sufficient to define it. According to these latter approaches, it is increased 
behavioural capacities (Christensen and Hooker, 2000) or a higher degree of organisational complexity, namely a 
nervous system with its own distinctive norms (Barandiaran and Moreno, 2006; Moreno and Mossio, 2015), which are 
the primary discriminating dimensions of cognition. We will not address these issues here, as we will limit ourselves to 
analyse how some specific features related to cognition emerge in biological systems, and not whether or not they can 
be considered sufficient for full-fledged cognition 
2
 For a discussion of the relation between cognition and (homeostatic) regulation in higher organisms with nervous 
system see for example Damasio, 2003, Ziemke and Lowe, 2009. 
3
 It can be argued that proto-mechanisms of regulation, in addition to molecular stability, could have played a role in 
prebiotic evolution (Bich and Damiano, 2012b) 
4
 A clarification is necessary in this respect. We are interested here in that branch of synthetic biology which aims at a 
better understanding of how living systems work, especially their minimal instances, rather than at engineering 
organisms that perform specific tasks (for the latter approach see Silver and Way, 2014; Arnold and Meyerowitz, 2014). 
We refer to that practice of knowledge that, instead of studying living systems by analysing their parts or by 
formulating predictive models of their behaviours, intends to understand their functioning by actually constructing the 
object of study (Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999; Damiano et al., 2011, Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, 2013), an alternative 
biological or proto-biological system, and study the properties and behaviours it exhibits. 
3 
 
approaches in bio-chem-ICT (see, e.g. Amos et al, 2011, and Rampioni et al., 2014). The aims, 
scope and conceptual foundations of this enterprise are still in course of definition and, we argue, a 
theoretical account of those minimal cognitive properties that can be studied at the level on which 
SB operates can provide both the missing connections between SB and AI, and a theoretical support 
for the empirical study of minimal cognition by means of artificial biochemical systems.  
On the basis of theoretical considerations on what minimal cognitive properties are and how they 
originated, we aim at providing a framework for SB-based AI that is distinct in target and goals 
from existing ones. Focused on developing a dimension of autonomy in artificial systems analogous 
to that exhibited by living organisms, it aims at a deeper understanding of the origin of minimal 
cognition in terms of instantiation of regulatory capabilities in artificial systems. In such a scenario 
the dimension of normativity (Bickhard, 2009; Mossio and Bich, 2014) ─ how an autonomous 
system can generate its intrinsic goals and norms, that coincide with its own self-maintenance, 
rather than having them imposed from outside by the designer ─ plays a crucial role. Other more 
engineering-oriented approaches such as those reviewed in Amos et al (2011), instead, are mainly 
focused input-output relations, and on computing through biochemical systems. The research 
proposed by Rampioni et al. (2014), on the other hand, shares with our approach a common 
theoretical framework, that of autonomy, and similar general goals: a better understanding of 
minimal cognition rather than the development of biochemical tools only. Then it focuses on 
different issues, even though closely related to those addressed in this paper: the study of bacterial 
communication and, specifically, of signal transmission between synthetic and living cells ─ 
namely synthetic cells sending signals to bacterial ones ─ while we will focus here on the 
biochemical requirements for the emergence of cognition and for the implementation of cognitive-
like properties in synthetic systems.  
Our goals, as stated above, are primarily theoretical. In this paper we will mainly focus on how 
some essential requirements for cognition have appeared. In particular, we will argue that specific 
mechanisms of internal compensation for perturbations are those responsible for the emergence of a 
capacity to distinguish between specific features of the interactions with the environment which, 
otherwise, would constitute only a mere source of noise for the system. In Sections 2 and 3, we will 
distinguish between two forms of compensation for perturbations: respectively, dynamic stability 
and adaptive regulation. And we will show how only the second ─ based on a decoupling between 
constitutive metabolism and regulatory mechanisms, and on the capacity to produce endogenous 
interpretations and evaluations of environmental stimuli ─ enables more complex interactions 
between an organism and its environment, in which a world of ‘meaningful’ (i.e. functional for the 
system) specificities emerges for the system. In Section 4 we will present a comparative case study 
in which to confront the role of these different compensatory mechanisms in distinct instances of 
chemotactic behaviour. In Section 5, we will argue in favour of a privileged role for Synthetic 
Biology in the study of these properties at the very roots of agency and cognition. 
2.Basic self-maintaining metabolic networks: structural stability against environmental noise  
According to the framework based on the notion of biological autonomy (Varela, 1979, Kauffman, 
2000; Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, 2004) living systems con be characterised as far from equilibrium 
self-maintaining chemical systems capable of producing their own functional components and 
physical boundary. In doing so, they maintain themselves as organised unities by promoting the 
conditions of their own existence through interactions with a changing environment. The idea of 
biological autonomy (Fig. 1) emphasises (1) the self-referential character of living systems as self-
producing and self-maintaining systems ─ understood through the notion of organisational closure 
(Piaget, 1967; Rosen, 1972, 1991; Maturana and Varela, 1973, 1980; Ganti, 1975, 2003; Kauffman, 
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What are the implications of these basic responses for our discussion of the roots of cognition and, 
more specifically, of the capability of a minimal biological system to handle and endogenously 
evaluate specific perturbations? The response of the perturbed system is surely dependent on its 
internal structure, i.e. it is embedded in the organisation of its self-maintaining metabolism. 
Therefore, the interaction with the environment cannot be simply characterised as a trivial input-
output relation. Yet, as we shall argue next, stability mechanisms are too simple to account for the 
origins of specific, meaningful, interactions. The reason is that from the point of view of the internal 
operations of the system there is no such thing as an endogenous recognition of a specific change 
and a consequent activation of a response aimed at handling it. 
Admittedly, this type of basic ─ and probably only prebiotic ─ organisation could enable 
associations between perturbations and their final effects on the system: the result of internal chains 
of adjustments. Hence, the system can indeed be said to establish some ‘classes of equivalence’ 
(Rosen, 1978) 7 with respect to its interactions with the environment. Yet, these correlations are 
valid only for an external observer who identifies correspondences between environmental 
variations and the results of the changes that they trigger: specifically, conservation of attractor, 
change of attractor, disintegration of the system. And, indeed, a designer can use this kind of system 
as a way to classify perturbations or sequences of perturbations according to its own goals and 
purposes.  
Hence, the crucial point here is that these correlations are not endogenously produced distinctions. 
They concern the final results of perturbations, whereas they do not affect operationally the way this 
result is achieved: the way the system handles the perturbations by changing its own internal 
dynamics. A system compensating for perturbations only on the basis of stability responses does not 
exhibit an internal capacity to functionally identify specific patterns within the set of perturbations 
disturbing its organisation, to attribute any specific meaning to them, and to act accordingly. For 
these reasons, in this basic scenario the environment is still an indistinct background, a source of 
noise, which exerts some influence on the system. The latter has no capacity to distinguish between 
specific features of its interactions with the environment, which acts only as source of viable or 
non-viable perturbations.  
In sum, basic self-maintaining metabolic networks, however capable of certain forms of ‘adaptive’ 
responses, do not display those capabilities necessary for the emergence of minimal cognition. A 
more complex organisation is necessary, which harbours mechanisms that go beyond such basic 
metabolism.  
3. Regulation and the emergence of an endogenously generated ‘World’ 
What is necessary to overcome the inherent limitations of basic structural stability is the 
instantiation of a dedicated regulatory subsystem able to endow the system with the capability of 
acting on its own internal dynamics by modifying them in relation to changing external conditions. 
However, this is not a trivial question. The realisation of a regulatory subsystem does not simply 
amount to an addition of a new functional structure or subsystem to the basic self-maintaining 
metabolic network. Adding an additional node, in fact, would just result in a larger functional 
network, which would still compensate for perturbations through stability behaviours. Hence, what 
is required for achieving effective regulatory control is a subsystem ‘that is sufficiently independent 
of the dynamics of the controlled processes, and which can be varied without disrupting these 
processes, but it is still able to be linked to parts of the mechanism controlled system [(the regulated 
subsystem)] so as to be able to modulate their operations’ (Bechtel, 2007: p 290. See also 
Christensen, 2007). More specifically, the appearance of a regulatory subsystem implies that the 
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dashed arrows: interactive processes (system-environment) 
 
As represented schematically in Fig. 2 above, and analysed in detail in Bich et al. (2015), the 
activity of R unfolds in the following steps. In the absence of perturbations the constitutive regime 
(C1-..Cn) interacts viably with the environment. It produces and maintains the regulatory subsystem 
(R), which does not participate in the production processes or otherwise it would be just a part of a 
more comprehensive network C. At this stage R is not operating on C. The first transition takes 
place with the activation of R. The regulatory subsystem is activated by a specific 
change/perturbation (or a specific set of changes/perturbations) P in either internal or external 
conditions9. The subsequent step, the regulatory action, takes place when the activated R/P acts on 
C, by modulating the activity of the functional components of the latter. In doing so, R/P brings 
forth a transition to a new different constitutive regime C' (C1’-...Cj’)10. Such regulatory action is 
operationally independent of the activity of C: it depends only on the organisation of the subsystem 
R and on the specific nature of the perturbation P. As a result of it, the new regime C' brought forth 
by R/P is now capable of coping with the environmental variation/perturbation which activated R to 
R/P. 
The regulatory subsystem is therefore responsible for mediating the effect of the perturbation P on 
the self-maintaining metabolic network C. It does so by modulating C and integrating the 
perturbation in a new internal regime capable of coping with it: for example a shift between the 
metabolisms of different sugars operated by a genetic regulatory subsystem like the lac-operon, 
which brings forth an adaptive response to variations in the composition of the environment (in this 
case the presence or absence of specific sugar sources). 
Let us consider now the role of regulation in relation to our discussion of the roots of cognition, and 
compare it to the case of stability. The fundamental difference between the two cases analysed here 
is that when a mechanism of regulation is at work, the environment is not only a source of 
indistinguishable perturbations, but also of specific and recognizable ones. The crucial point is that 
the system endowed with regulatory mechanisms reacts in a very new way: it does things according 
to what it distinguishes in its interactions with the environment ─ i.e. what activates the regulatory 
subsystem. Actually, the ‘recognition’ in fact is a complex process, since the specific features of the 
interactions with the environment which are responsible for triggering the regulatory subsystem do 
not drive directly the response of the system, such as in the case of basic network responses. In fact, 
the perturbation activates the regulatory subsystem, which in turns modulates the basic constitutive 
network in such a way as to cope with the specific environmental feature which triggered the 
regulatory response: the organism eats a new source of food, or secrets chemicals to neutralise a 
lethal substance, etc. In other words, the fact of recognition is both a consequence of the specificity 
of the perturbation and of the internal normative organisation of the system. 
In such a scenario an environmental perturbation becomes a specific and recognizable interaction 
because of the nature of the relation it holds with the regulatory subsystem. The regulatory 
subsystem is sensitive to it in the sense that it endogenously establishes classes of equivalence 
(Rosen 1978) in its environment with respect to these specific variations: according to how the 
variations activate R and trigger the regulatory action. These classes of equivalence do not consist 
in externally established associations between perturbations and the results of the changes triggered 
in the system as a whole, as in the previous case. Rather, they are the results of the evaluation 
                                                 
9
 It is important to notice that R is not activated by a variation in its concentration (the amount ∆R, corresponding to a 
variation of the production of R by C), since the activation step is not stoichiometrically coupled to the dynamics of C. 
10
 By different constitutive regime we mean a basic self-maintaining network (C’) that is capable of doing something 
different than before. The difference between C and C’ can be minimal, for example involving only the presence of one 
or few enzymes. 
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(activation of R plus regulatory action on C) operated by the regulatory subsystem, and therefore 
they achieve an endogenous, operational, significance for the system11. 
Hence, beyond the debate about whether or not cognition is coextensive with life, it is clear that 
regulation becomes a necessary condition for the emergence of cognition, if we consider as an 
essential aspect of cognition the fact that the cogniser should be capable to transform an external 
influence into an adaptive integration or, in cognitive terms, into a meaningful interpretation 
(Heschl, 1990). And this fundamental requirement for cognition is realised only by regulation, 
rather than by basic biological self-production and self-maintenance (i.e. minimal autopoietic 
systems), as some of the defenders of L=C have argued. A system with regulatory capacities, in 
fact, is able to do things according to what it distinguishes (what the regulatory subsystem is 
sensitive to). Consequently, the interactions with the environment become more than just a source 
of indistinct noise, but are converted into a world of endogenously generated (naturalised) 
significances -- an Umwelt, (von Uexküll, 1926): interactions become functionally ‘meaningful’ 12 
for the system itself, no longer for an external observer only.  
In turn, this capacity of sensing specific features of the interaction with the environment enables 
regulatory-guided actions. The system endowed with these specific regulatory capacities behaves as 
an adaptive agent because it has the regulatory capacity to discriminate between different 
environmental conditions and to normatively trigger those actions whose outcomes would become 
functional for the system. As a matter of fact, virtually all present-day organisms – even the 
simplest ones – possess the capacity to adapt their actions in accordance with different 
environmental conditions. They are able to detect potentially deleterious or favourable variations in 
the environment and to trigger the selection of an adequate functional action within their available 
repertoire. On the other hand, adaptive agency was preceded by more primitive forms of agency. 
Probably, cellular proto-metabolisms were homeostatic, in the sense that they compensated for 
internal and external perturbations by means of network mechanisms integrated and distributed into 
their constitutive organisation: basically through structural stability. 
In the next section we will analyse the differences between these two forms of interaction with the 
environment (regulatory driven behaviour and stability driven behaviour) by analysing the case of 
bacterial chemotaxis. 
4. Different forms of tactic behaviour and their significance for the origin of cognition  
Chemotaxis is a form of behavioural adaptive response to changing environmental conditions which 
typically involves regulatory mechanisms. It consists in the capability to modulate the direction of 
the swimming movement on the basis of the composition and the gradient of concentration of 
metabolites in the medium (Eisenbach, 2004; 2007; Wadhams and Armitage, 2004)13. 
The capability of moving towards or away from a chemical source is not a prerogative of living 
systems. For example, in the domain of SB there are several relatively simple artificial systems ─ 
like the well known case of self-propelled oil droplets (Hanczyc and Ikegami, 2010) ─ which 
exhibit complex ‘self-induced’ behaviours by moving directionally within chemical gradients. Yet, 
even though realizing some positive feedback between internal convection dynamics and movement 
in the medium, the sustained movement of droplets is qualitatively different from the autonomous 
                                                 
11Thus, ultimately, it is the whole autonomous organisation of the system what grounds the normative evaluation ─ that 
is, the evaluation related to the self-maintenance of the systems. 
12Here we use the term ‘meaning’ as synonymous with ‘functional for the system’ (see Barandiaran, 2008, ch. 5,6). 
More specifically, in this paper a source of perturbation becomes meaningful when it can distinguished by the system 
(by R) and such distinction has an operational effect on the system. Through the action of R the system it modulates its 
own activity (in C) on the basis of this distinction in such a way as to contribute to its own self-maintenance. 
13
 See also van Duijin et al. (2006) for a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the debate about minimal 
cognition. 
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self-maintained movement of living cells. The crucial process for the generation of movement takes 
place at the interface between droplet and environment: the latter plays a direct role in the 
generation of movement, rather than being ‘only’ the source of matter, energy, and possible 
distinctions like it is for living systems14. And the direction of droplets taxis is directly controlled by 
external conditions (pH gradients). It is a very interesting  case of physical dynamic stability, 
realised through the direct coupling between the droplet dynamics and its environmental gradients. 
While droplets’s movement is to an important degree co-determined by the environment, and its 
direction is governed by the external gradient, this is not the case for bacteria, which are 
‘intrinsically active’ (Bechtel, 2008) due to their capability of self-maintenance. Their movement, in 
fact, is not only internally generated by the same regime that produces and maintains the system, it 
is also ‘inherently goal-oriented’ (Barham, 2012)15. Using Kauffman’s expression, bacteria are 
autonomous systems because they ‘act on their own behalf’ (Kauffman, 2000). Yet, as we shall see 
below, an inherent activity underlying chemotaxis is not enough to cope with the question discussed 
in this paper, namely, the emergence of systems endowed with the capacity to detect specific 
features of their interactions with the environment, to integrate them into their organisation, and to 
trigger adaptive actions. 
In bacterial chemotactic behaviour the control of movement direction is essentially obtained by 
modulating the rotation of the flagella. There are two possible dynamic or motor states: counter-
clockwise, which leads to straight movement (running behaviour), and clockwise, which triggers 
the rotation of the whole bacterium (tumbling behaviour). The default mode is counter-clockwise, 
allowing the bacterium to move steadily in a given direction. Exploration of the surrounding 
medium in other directions involves switching back and forth between these two dynamic states. 
We can conceive, at least in principle, of a very basic form of chemotaxis in which the modulation 
of movement neither relies on a dedicated control subsystem, nor depends on the distinction of 
specific features of their interaction with the environment. As proposed by Goldstein and Soyer 
(2008) and Egbert et al. (2010), it is possible to hypothesise a mechanism of metabolism-based 
chemotaxis in which the receptor complex and the signal transduction pathways are absent, while 
the rotation of flagella is stoichiometrically linked to the metabolic processes. In the model 
proposed by Egbert et al. (2010) (the third diagram in Fig. 3), it is the concentration of a product of 
metabolism that determines whether the rotation of the flagella motor is counter-clockwise or 
clockwise. The result is an interesting case of a stoichiometrical coupling between behaviour and 
metabolism, which entails a straightforward dependence of the direction of movement on 
metabolism, while a dedicated regulatory subsystem is absent.  
                                                 
14
 The movement of the cell is generated from within, for example by the action of an internally produced flagellum. 
There are some important considerations to be made regarding the different nature of sustained movement (droplets) 
with respect to self-maintained autonomous movement (cells): 
1) Droplets do not self-maintain like living cells instead do; 
2) Droplets’ activity (movement) does not depend on getting nutrients (matter and energy) from the environment. They 
move by consuming the internal oleic anhydride that is already available; 
3) There is no normativity in the movement: it does not contribute to the existence and maintenance of the droplet. 
4) There is no internal organisational differentiation (no modular units) in the droplets. 
It could be still said that the self-sustained movement of the droplets (but not the droplets themselves) can be considered 
as self maintaining in a minimal sense (although a different sense from the one used in this paper), insofar as the 
movement is co-driven by internal processes and gradients, and it exhibits a certain degree of robustness. 
15The intrinsic goal that produces the movement is the maintenance of the organism. For a detailed discussion of 
intrinsic teleology in biological systems from a perspective based on autonomy, see Mossio and Bich (2014). 
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In particular, the protein CheY is a central player in the regulatory process. Depending on its 
different states of activation, it can link to both complexes: receptors and flagellum. In a non-
phosphorylated state it binds to the receptor. When the receptor is activated by a change in the 
effector17, CheY is phosphorylated, decreasing its affinity to the receptor and, at the same time, 
increasing its affinity to the switch protein FliM in the flagellum complex. By detaching from the 
former and binding to the latter, CheY triggers an alteration of the flagellum rotation from counter-
clockwise to clockwise and, therefore, determines a change in the swimming movement of the 
bacterial cell, from running to tumbling. In this manner, the signal transduction pathway (receptor 
complex plus signal proteins) is able to modulate the movement of the cell.  
Stoichiometrically speaking, the activity of the regulatory subsystem (receptor plus bridge/signal 
proteins) is dynamically decoupled from that of the motor subsystem it modulates, and from 
metabolism: it is not the synthesis and concentration of CheY and of the other molecules in the 
receptor subsystem and in the signal transmission pathway that modulate the direction of the 
rotation of the flagella. The activity of the regulatory subsystem, even if it is materially and 
energetically supported by metabolism, becomes operationally independent from it, and the 
modulation it performs on the motor system is not achieved through an increase in the concentration 
of CheY, but rather by means of cascades of signals and activations. Unlike the previous case of 
metabolism-based chemotaxis, the regulatory subsystem is activated by a specific set of 
perturbations (specified by the organisation of the receptors), and can reversibly switch between 
different states of the flagellum subsystem in relation to them. The regulated behaviour is then able 
to cope with the perturbations, by allowing changes in the swimming direction. Thereby, it also 
becomes functional, because it contributes to the maintenance of the system, keeping metabolism 
within viable conditions. 
The distinctive feature of this more complex case of chemotactic behaviour is that the system, 
thanks to the action of a regulatory subsystem, is capable of modulating its behaviours on the basis 
of specific interactions with the environment, which acquires a specific operational meaning for the 
system, in such a way that the latter is able to change its behaviour accordingly. This is made 
possible by the fact that the regulatory subsystem is decoupled from the others. This decoupling, in 
fact, introduces a new degree of freedom in the system, one or more new variables in the regulatory 
subsystem that are not directly dependent on the constitutive regime and therefore can be sensitive 
to something different than the internal state of the system: in this case a feature of the environment. 
Such feature acquires significance for the whole system, and the decoupled subsystem achieves a 
functional role when the effect of its regulatory action, triggered by the perturbation, contributes to 
the maintenance of the system. Starting from this relatively elementary chemotactic mechanism, 
then, a variety of more complex tactic behaviours can be implemented (Eisenbach, 2004). What is 
common to them, is that they cannot be treated in terms of input-output, as if the behaviour of the 
system were driven by the perturbation. On the contrary, they can be characterised in terms of 
endogenous generation of adaptive response by focusing on the internal organisation of the system 
and, especially, of its regulatory subsystems.   
In sum, bacterial chemotaxis represents a clear comparative example of how certain capabilities 
fundamental for the origin of cognition can emerge in minimal living systems, and of how this is 
only possible through the action of regulatory mechanisms. Even though physical or unregulated 
biological systems can in principle exhibit similar behavioural phenomenologies, the way changes 
in environmental conditions are handled and the role they play for the system organisation are 
radically different. And it is only in the presence of regulation that perturbations acquire a specific 
significance for the system. 
                                                 
17It is the organisation of the receptor module that determines which perturbations will trigger an actual regulatory and 
behavioural response. 
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5. Issues related to the investigation of minimal cognitive-like properties by means of artificial 
systems  
Different approaches can be used to investigate with the aid of artificial systems how these 
capacities could emerge in minimal biological and, possibly, prebiotic or proto-biological systems: 
computational, hardware-based and wet biochemical approaches18. Yet, these approaches have to 
face specific issues related to the specificity of the domain in which these properties are realised and 
of their organisational requirements. 
As we have argued in the previous sections, the capability to evaluate perturbations and to act 
accordingly requires the presence of basic regulatory mechanisms. These mechanisms have specific 
features, and there arise crucial theoretical issues that have to be taken into consideration for their 
artificial realisation or for their investigation with the help of artificial model systems. 
In the first place, regulatory mechanisms in biological systems are endogenously produced and 
maintained by the same system that they regulate -- or otherwise we could not speak of biological 
(self-) regulation, but of externally imposed control --and they functionally contribute to the 
existence of the same system that produces them. This is a fundamental difference with analogous 
artificial cybernetic systems, in which parts are put together and just interact without their 
operations affecting their conditions of existence. In biological systems the generation of regulatory 
behaviours is not as simple as adding exogenously one or various modules to get a specific or more 
efficient input-output correlation: it must be developed from within, from a complex network of 
components and transformation processes functionally linked together to maintain themselves in far 
from equilibrium conditions; and this involves a more elaborated organisational architecture.  
This is the reason why, secondly, one of the organisational aspects of biological regulation ─ a 
partial decoupling of the processes within the system ─ plays a crucial role. In non-chemical 
artificial systems, in fact, it might be easier to realise or identify a decoupling between regulating 
and regulated subsystems. In the biochemical domain, though, it is necessary to find ways to free 
the regulatory subsystem from the stoichiometrical coupling with the constitutive regime, while at 
the same time having the regulatory subsystem produced from within. Indeed, a synthetic attempt to 
build and study biological regulatory mechanisms cannot escape the fact that they are realised in the 
biochemical domain, which has very distinctive properties and fundamental constraints compared to 
the domains in which computational and hardware models are realised (Rosen, 1991). In particular, 
the absence of the distinction between software and hardware, or between fixed physical structures 
and variable operations, does imply looser forms of modularity, as well as transformative 
interactions. As a consequence, decoupling has to be realised or identified in dynamical rather than 
physical/structural terms. 
A fundamental theoretical issue consists in the fact that we aim at modelling a system to which we 
can attribute its own purpose and normativity. This internal normativity arises from the dissipative, 
FFE self-producing/maintaining organisation of living organisms. And that is why we focus on SB 
rather than on the traditional cybernetic modelling. The goal-oriented dimension of regulation has to 
be taken into account in its distinctive biological character. As pointed out already by Jonas in his 
criticism of cybernetics (Jonas, 1966), artificial self-stabilizing or self-regulating systems do not 
have an intrinsic goal ─ which, according to the early cyberneticians (Rosenblueth et al, 1943) was 
just to be identified with the final state ─ but follow only a purpose specified by an external 
designer. In living systems, on the other hand, goals are generated within the same system that 
produces and maintains the regulatory mechanism itself. The goal of artefacts does not coincide 
with their own existence: it is the case of droplet taxis addressed in Section 4 above, in which 
movement does not contribute to the conditions of existence of the system. In biological systems as 
self-maintaining systems, on the other hand, their goal and their own existence are one and the same 
                                                 
18
 And indeed they are used. The model system proposed by Egbert et al. (2010) for the study of adaptive and 
evolutionary possibilities opened by metabolism-based chemotaxis is an example of the first approach. 
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thing (Mossio et al. 2009). Therefore their conditions of existence are also the intrinsic (and 
naturalised) norms of their own activity: being a dissipative organisation, the system ‘must’ behave 
in a specific way, otherwise it would cease to exist. In addition to that, regulated systems do not 
have just an intrinsic normativity. Regulation adds something by expanding its constitutive 
normativity: the system in fact not only generates intrinsic norms, but crucially modulates these 
norms in order to promote its own maintenance. In other words, the regulatory mechanism has, so 
to speak, an explicit goal, in the sense that it specifies, in each circumstance, how to ensure the 
maintenance of the system that harbours it. 
Given these premises, how can we approach the study of the emergence of minimal cognitive-like 
properties in artificial systems? Of course, an approach in this direction does not focus on the 
performance of biologically inspired artificial systems in carrying out some cognitive tasks, but 
rather aims at a better understanding of the emergence of cognitively relevant capabilities in 
minimal living systems, considered as contributions to the maintenance of their autonomous 
organisation. One answer could be, for example, to simulate minimal regulatory behaviours in 
virtual protocells so as to explore some of their implications and requirements, or even realise 
simple hardware-based adaptive model systems and observe their behaviours under perturbations. 
Non-biochemically based artificial systems, though, do not satisfy the requirement for two of the 
main features of regulation, namely its grounding in metabolic self-production and its intrinsic 
normativity, which are fundamental in understanding regulation. In this respect the wet 
(biochemical) domain presents advantages compared to the hardware and computational ones19. 
Simplified proto-cognitive mechanisms can be realised and studied by synthetic tools in the same 
domain in which they are realised in nature, in a way that makes it possible, at least in principle, to 
investigate all their distinctive features: from their specific form of decoupling and their realisation 
from within the system, to their functional contribution to the viability of the system that produces 
them. Hence, Synthetic Biology can provide modelling tools rooted in metabolic mechanisms, tools 
that are not directly available to the others domains of Artificial Intelligence20. And for these 
reasons it can constitute an important complement to them. 
More specifically, the wet synthetic approach can play a pivotal role in investigating how 
fundamental properties associated with cognition emerged and acquired a crucial role in early or 
even proto biological systems. On the basis of the theoretical account developed in the previous 
sections, the goal of a research programme aimed at studying SB based AI is to realise artificial 
systems that are endowed with properties that are relevant for minimal cognition: specifically, 
systems capable to autonomously compensate for perturbations, and which activity is evaluated in 
terms of self-maintenance and variety of responses, rather than input-out systems, evaluated in 
terms of performance. This can be done by realising and manipulating biochemical model systems 
with basic regulatory mechanisms, and by observing their adaptive behaviours in changing 
environments. In such a way a program based on this theoretical framework can contribute both to 
the creation of a minimal biochemical artificial ‘intelligence’ and to an understanding of the role 
played by cognitive-like properties in the origins and early evolution of life. 
Both top-down and bottom-up strategies can be explored in this respect. The former can be 
implemented by simplifying regulatory mechanisms in actual living organisms down to their still 
functional basic organisational skeletons. The goal of such an approach would be to identify some 
fundamental modules for the production of cognitively relevant behaviours. In addition, by 
manipulating their basic modules, such as their signal receptors, internal circuit organisation or 
regulatory effectors, it would be possible to observe their different behaviours in changing 
                                                 
19
 As it has been argued elsewhere (Rosen, 1991; Moreno and Etxeberria, 2005) the autonomous organisation of 
organisms cannot be realised but in a chemical domain. 
20
 For a discussion of the difference between virtual and biochemical metabolisms see Rosen (1991) and Boden (1999). 
For a discussion of the importance for AI in general to focus on the organismic roots of agency and cognition see Froese 
and Ziemke (2009). 
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environments. These experiments could provide relevant information on how changes induced by 
manipulations can be compensated or lead to non-viable dead ends, and whether, and under which 
conditions, they give rise to unexpected emergent functional behaviours. 
From the bottom-up point of view, technically the task does not seem an easy one, but some basic 
insights from the discussion developed in the previous sections can be explored. The idea would be 
to implement very simple regulatory mechanisms in self-maintaining protocells, and: (a) to study 
their behaviours in possible pre-biotic environments; or (b) to have these biochemical self-regulated 
systems interact with one another and study collective proto-cognitive behaviours, as plausible 
precursors of the behaviour of present day social bacteria21. This latter line of investigation could 
provide information on the possible role played by the collective behaviour of protocells colonies in 
prebiotic evolution.  
One of the main difficulties for this line of research would be to realise dynamical decoupled 
regulatory mechanisms in such simple systems. A possible way to be explored would be that of 
stoichiometrical freedom, based at least partially on sequence rather than on concentration, as 
proposed by Griesemer and Szathmary (2009) in the case of the chemoton. In this respect, some of 
the best candidates are riboswitches, which can modulate their activity on the basis of interactions 
with effector molecules in a way analogous to allosteric enzymes, even though they are simpler in 
terms of structure and composition (Serganov and Nudler, 2013). As demonstrated experimentally 
by Martini and Mansy (2011), protocells with riboswitches can indeed sense specific molecules and 
respond to them by triggering gene expression. 
6. Concluding remarks 
How do minimal cognitive properties originate? The answer can be found in the capability of the 
autonomous organisation of biological systems to compensate for perturbations by distinguishing 
specific features of their interactions with the environment and respond accordingly.  
Most of the theoretical argument developed here has been dedicated to the analysis of the 
organisational requirements underlying different compensatory responses. We showed how, if we 
take the capability to make endogenously generated distinctions as a requisite for the emergence of 
minimal cognition then, contrary to the L=C thesis, the basic regime of self-production and self-
maintenance of these systems (a minimal form of autopoiesis) cannot exhibit those minimal 
cognitively relevant properties, inasmuch as they only respond globally to environmental 
perturbations by compensating noise. We argued, then, that the presence of decoupled regulatory 
subsystems marks a fundamental transition in this respect and it constitutes the fundamental 
requirement for the appearance of minimal cognitive properties. A regulated system, in fact, can 
evaluate perturbations and respond accordingly, in such a way that some features of the interaction 
with the environment acquire a meaning for the system, depending on the organisation of its 
regulatory subsystem. This difference between basic and regulatory responses becomes evident if 
we compare metabolism-based and metabolism-independent chemotaxis: in the first case the system 
has no way to evaluate its interactions with the environment, and can only respond to its own 
internal global state.  
By addressing the issue of cognition at the very basic level of biological organisation, the account 
proposed also bridges some of the gap between biochemical and cognitive concepts by providing an 
operational characterisation of notions such as distinction, significance, meaning and evaluation. 
With this organisational account of minimal cognition at hand, we have briefly explored the 
possibility of establishing a connection between biochemical SB and AI, and we have addressed 
                                                 
21
 In this specific case, the objectives of our account converge with those of the approach proposed by Rampioni et al. 
(2014). 
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some crucial issues related to the artificial realisation of those minimal regulatory mechanisms at 
the basis of cognitive-like properties.  
Finally, we have come to the conclusion that according to the theoretical account proposed here, the 
possible contributions of SB to AI could concern the understanding of the mechanism at the origin 
of some essential properties that are necessary for cognition, and its role in prebiotic evolution or in 
the early evolution of life. Specifically, they would consist in the implementation of molecular 
models of basic regulatory mechanisms and of regulation-based interactions with the environment, 
and in the investigation of the range, variety and complexity of these ‘meaningful’ interactions 
considered at the very roots of cognition. In doing so, SB would provide complementary 
information with respect to more traditional artificial approaches. In particular, by realising its 
models in the same domain in which proto-cognitive properties are actually instantiated, i.e. the 
biochemical domain, it can produce not only more plausible models but also unexpected and, 
therefore, very informative results, due to the systemic effects of biochemical interactions 
inaccessible to the other approaches. 
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